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I. INTRODUCTION
Confronted with the growing problem of crowded dockets, federal
courts have enacted and imposed a variety of rules and sanctions
designed to discourage abuse of the judicial process.1 In the interests of
justice, federal courts, pursuant to their inherent power,2 may award
attorney's fees to a party when his opponent has acted in "bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 3 Consequently, the
question of who should bear the brunt of those fees is likely to be an
issue in every lawsuit, large or small. Litigants would like to shift the
costs of their counsel to the opponent if possible, but under the Ameri-
can Rule, ("Rule") this generally cannot be accomplished.4 The Rule
1. See generally David W. Pollack, Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on
Attorney's who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHi L. REV. 619 (1977).
2. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973). The inherent power of the federal courts
"is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situa-
tion." Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
3. Hall, 412 U.S. at 4-5.
4. See Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's fees and the Federal Bad Faith Excep-
1
Rotbart: Sanctions and the Inherent Power: The Supreme Court Expands the A
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
provides that a prevailing party must bear his own attorney's fees and
cannot have them taxed against the loser.5 The Rule precludes a court,
without statutory authorization, from engaging in fee shifting as part of
the merits of the award.6 However, a litigant who abuses the judicial
process,' or acts in "obdurate obstinacy" may be faced with paying for
his adversary's attorney's fees. 9 The federal courts have long possessed
this inherent power to award attorney's fees as a sanction for bad faith
conduct.' 0
Nevertheless, most litigants point to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or a statute when the issue of sanctions is raised." However,
the authority to impose monetary sanctions pursuant to the inherent
power is older, deeper and broader than any other formal doctrine."2 It
has long been accepted that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily
result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institutions,"
powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a court because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others."' 3 These powers are regulated
tion, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 320 (1977). The American Rule states that attorney's fees
are not ordinarily recoverable as costs or damages in the absence of a statute authoriz-
ing the award of fees or an agreement between the parties providing for fees. See Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). Compare with
the "English Rule," where as early as 1275 the law courts of England were authorized
to award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff. Statute of Glouster, 1278, 6 Edw. 1, c. 1
(this statute mentioned only the cost of a writ purchased, but was liberally construed to
include attorney's fees).
5. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
6. Id. at 260; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2140 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
8. Id.
9. F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974).
10. Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; see also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562 n.6 (1986); Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689 n.14;
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59; F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 119; Newman v. Piggie Park
Enter. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per curiam); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 (1962).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Long, When Winning Isn't Enough: Boards of Contract
Appeals and Monetary Sanctions for Frivolous and Bad Faith Conduct in Administra-
tive Litigation, 27-50-10 ARMY. LAW. 37, 38 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Aly-
eska, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (holding inter alia, that federal courts may impose attorney's
fees pursuant to their inherent power when an attorney acts in bad faith, even though
the American Rule says otherwise).
13. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also Road-
1528 [Vol. 16
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not by any rules or statutes, but by the inherent authority "vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve orderly and expedi-
tious disposition of cases."1 4 Thus, the inherent power is necessary to
permit the courts to function and preserve its authority. 5
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc,' 6 the United States Supreme Court,
during its 1990 term, specifically addressed one issue: Whether a fed-
eral court sitting in diversity, can utilize its inherent power to assess
attorney's fees as a sanction for a party's bad-faith conduct." The Su-
preme Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity can impose
sanctions pursuant to their inherent power despite the existence of fed-
eral rules and statutes which prescribe equal sanctions.' 8 Such a ruling
however, can easily lead to inconsistent results among the federal
courts and undermine congress' goal of uniformity throughout the fed-
eral system.
Part two of this Comment reviews the procedural history and facts
of Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 9 part three examines the scope and de-
velopment of the courts' inherent power beginning from its inception, to
the "American rule" prohibiting substantive fee shifting and the bad
faith exception; part four reviews and analyzes the Supreme Court's
holding, and reasoning; and part five discusses the possible implications
and inconsistent results that Chambers might cause.
II. FACTS AND THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CHAMBERS V.
NASCO, INC.
On August 9, 1983, Chambers and his corporation, Calcasieu Tel-
evision and Radio ("CTR"), entered into a purchase agreement to sell
KPLC-TV to NASCO, Inc. ("NASCO").20 The agreement was never
way, 447 U.S. at 764 (inherent powers of federal courts are those which are necessary
to the exercise of all others (citing United States v. Hudson, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812)).
14. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S 626, 630-31 (1962).
15. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 785, 819-820
(Scalia, .1., concurring).
16. Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
17. Id. at 2128. At the Fifth Circuit, this case was known as NASCO, Inc. v.
Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1990), affig NASCO, Inc.
v Calcasieu Television and Radio, 124 F.R.D. 120 (W.D. La. 1989); NASCO, Inc. v.
Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. La. 1985).
18. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2128.
19. Id. at 2123.
20. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1373. Chambers was the sole shareholder and di-
15291992]
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recorded in the Calcasieu and Jefferson Davis Parishes where the
properties were located.2 However, by late August Chambers had
changed his mind and in September, he informed NASCO that he
would not file the necessary documents.22 On Friday, October 14,
NASCO's counsel informed counsel for Chambers that it would file
suit the following Monday seeking specific performance of the agree-
ment, as well as a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent the
alienation or encumbrance of the properties.23
On Sunday, October 16, the day before NASCO would file suit,
Chambers and his attorney knowingly and deliberately took advantage
of the notice given by NASCO, and set in motion an illegal and fraud-
ulent scheme.2" The pair conspired to deprive NASCO of a judicial
determination of its rights by attempting to place the properties at is-
sue beyond the district court's jurisdiction by using the Louisiana Pub-
lic Records Doctrine. 25 To this end, Chambers and his counsel formed
rector of (CTR) which operated a television station in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Id.
21. Id. at 1373-74. The failure to record the purchase agreement in the respec-
tive counties would later be used by Chambers as a means to deprive the district court
of its~jurisdiction. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.RD. at 125.
22. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1373-74. The purchase agreement required
NASCO and CTR to use their best efforts in obtaining the requisite approval of the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") for the transfer of the station's license.
Id. Furthermore, the Agreement obligated both parties to file the necessary documents
with the FCC no later than September 23, 1983. Id.
23. Id. at 1376. The suit was filed the following Monday in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Id. at 1375. Notice was given to
the defendants Chambers and CTR pursuant to the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(b) and Rule 11 (now Rule 10) of the local rules of the court which
are designed to give a defendant in a temporary restraining order application notice of
the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1376.
24. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 125.
25. Id. The Louisiana Public Records Doctrine states that contracts affecting im-
movable property must be recorded in order to affect third parties. Dallas v. Farring-
ton, 490 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. 1986). The Public Records doctrine is essentially a nega-
tive doctrine declaring what is not recorded is not effective, except between the parties,
and a third party in purchasing immovable property is entitled to rely on the absence
from the public records of any unrecorded interest in the property. Id.; see also Phillips
v. Parker, 483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986).
Because the purchase agreement had never been recorded, Chambers and his
counsel determined that if the properties were sold to a third party, and these deeds
were recorded before the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the district court
would lack jurisdiction over the properties. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1381. Thus,
NASCO would be deprived of a judicial determination of its rights to specific perform-
ance, and Chambers could maintain possession of his station. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D.
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a trust, appointing Chambers' sister as the trustee and naming Cham-
bers' three adult children as the beneficiaries.2 6 Despite knowledge that
the land on which the television station and the associated properties
were located was to be sold to NASCO under the purchase agreement,
Chambers directed CTR to execute duplicate warranty deeds to the
trustee: for consideration of $1.4 million.2 7 The deeds were recorded
early Monday morning, before NASCO's counsel appeared in the dis-
trict court to file the complaint and seek the TRO.18 Despite the dis-
trict court's questioning at the TRO hearing concerning the possibility
that CTR was negotiating to sell the properties to a third party, Cham-
bers' counsel made no mention of the recordation of the deeds earlier
that day.29 The next morning, after the TRO had been issued, Cham-
bers' attorney notified the District Court of the recordation of the deeds
the day before, and admitted to intentionally withholding this informa-
tion from the court.
The following week the district court granted a preliminary in-
junction against Chambers and CTR, and entered a second TRO di-
rected against the trustee to prevent her from selling, transferring or in
any way encumbering the CTR properties."0 Within the next week,
Chambers' attorneys prepared a leaseback agreement from the trustee
to CTR, so that CTR could remain in possession of the properties and
continue to operate the station.31 At the second TRO hearing, the dis-
trict court was unaware of the leaseback agreement, but warned
Chambers and his attorney that their conduct had been unethical and
at 125.
26. NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1376.
27. Id. Chambers phoned his sister, Baker, and informed her of the creation of
the trust and that it was his desire that she act as trustee; however, he did not inform
her of the duplicate deeds, which had been executed, or that the trust was undercapi-
talized. Id. In fact, the assets never exceeded $1,000 which was insufficient to meet the
$17,735 monthly payment by the trust. Id. at 1378 Nonetheless, Chambers and his
counsel were not concerned since Chambers had absolute control of the trustee. Id.
28. Id. at 1376. The deeds had not been signed by the trustee, none of the con-
sideration had been paid and CTR continued in undisturbed possession, despite the
recordation of the deeds. Id.
29. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 126. Also, the district court judge was unaware
that Chambers' attorney had tape recorded certain conferences which had been con-
ducted over the phone. Id. at 126 n.8.
30. Id.
31. Id. The trustee had no knowledge of the lease or its terms, did not take part
in the negotiations, and simply signed and returned the lease to Chambers. Id.
19921 1531
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that no such act should be repeated in the future. 2
Chambers subsequently entered a series of groundless motions,
charges and pleadings aimed at delaying the judicial process and de-
priving NASCO of its rights under the purchase agreement."3 After the
district court found that the motions were all filed "in absolute bad
faith;" that the charges were "deliberate untruths and fabrications,"
plainly "improbable and unrealistic;" and that the pleadings were
"simply part of a sordid scheme of deliberate misuse of the judicial
process," further warnings were issued.3' Finally, on the eve of trial,
Chambers stipulated that the purchase agreement was valid and en-
forceable, and that he had breached the agreement by failing to file the
necessary documents with the Federal Communications Commission
32. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 127. Despite this reprimand, Chambers' abuse
of the judicial process continued. Id. In November 1983, Chambers refused to allow
NASCO to inspect CTR's corporate records in direct contravention of the standing
preliminary injunction. Id. The resulting contempt proceedings, NASCO, Inc. v. Calca-
sieu Television and Radio, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. La. 1985), vindicated
NASCO's rights, but at the cost of much expense, delay, and waste of resources. This
was compounded by Chambers' attorney's prosecution of two separate and independent
appeals which were dismissed by the appellate court. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Televi-
sion and Radio, Inc., 757 F.2d 157, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1985).
33. NASCO, Inc. 124 F.R.D. at 127. Two motions for summary judgment were
filed by counsel on behalf of Chambers; a third motion for summary judgment followed
by a motion to strike were filed on behalf of the trustee; and, a motion for a protective
order and clarification were filed on behalf of Chambers. Id. at 127-28. Next, Cham-
bers through his attorney filed baseless charges and counterclaims against NASCO
alleging fraud, harassment, interference with TV station operation, spreading of misin-
formation and public disapproval of the sale. Id. Also, alleged were unnamed breaches
of the purchase agreement by NASCO and NASCO's disregard for a non-existent oral
agreement with Chambers. Pointless new issues were injected: NASCO's conduct of its
FCC ascertainment survey; its ability to pay the purchase price; and its plans for the
future management and commitment to the community interest. Id. Needless deposi-
tions of the bank officials, who were to finance the purchase, were noticed by Cham-
bers' counsel and depositions of the NASCO board of directors were taken. The district
court noted that throughout the course of the proceedings, Chambers, (CTR) and his
counsel sought, and sometimes received, continuances of trial dates, extensions of dead-
lines and deferment of scheduled discovery. Id. at 127-28. Pretrial and status confer-
ences were held where several motions in preparation for a trial on the merits were
ruled upon. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 127-28. However, a motion to recuse the trial
judge for bias and prejudice by Chambers was denied. A writ of mandamus to compel
disqualification of the judge was also filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit on behalf of Chambers; however, this was also denied. Id. Nonetheless, trial on
the merits was again delayed.
34. Id. at 128.
[Vol. 161532
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("FCC"). 3 At trial, the only defense presented was the Public Records
Doctrine. 6
Between the trial on the merits and the entry of the district court's
judgment against Chambers, he continued to use every ruse possible to
evade performance of the purchase agreement."' Chambers, without
notifying NASCO, sought permission from the FCC to construct a new
transmission tower for the station and to relocate the transmission fa-
cilities to that site. 38 Only after NASCO threatened further contempt
sanctions and informal intervention did Chambers withdraw his appli-
cation from the FCC. The district court then entered judgment on the
merits, in NASCO's favor, 9 finding that the trustee did not qualify as a
third party purchaser under the Public Records Doctrine."'
However, Chambers' adamant tactics did not end here."1 During
the pendency of his appeal, Chambers caused CTR officials to lodge
formal opposition with the FCC against its approval of the transfer of
the station license. 2 NASCO sought contempt sanctions for a third
35. Id. The district court noted that at this point there was no clearer indication
that all of the previously asserted affirmative defenses, counterclaims, pleadings, mo-
tions and opposition prosecuted so vehemently by the defendants were untruths and
distortions, absolutely devoid of any substantive merit. Id.
36. Id. The district court stated that in any event, this defense was manufactured
as part of the "initial fraud". Id.
37. Id. at 128-29.
38. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. Chambers' goal in relocating the facilities
was to render the Purchase Agreement meaningless, since by moving the facilities, the
tower sites would no longer be covered by the Purchase Agreement. Id.
39. NASCO, Inc., 623 F. Supp. at 1385. The district court found that the trans-
fer of the properties to the trust was a simulated sale, and that the deeds purporting to
convey the properties were "null, void, and of no effect." Id.
40. Id. The court found that at the recordation of the deeds, the trustee had no
knowledge of the value, extent, location of the properties, the purchase price, and
whether the sale had ever taken place. Id. Under Louisiana law, a party interposed by
the seller for the sole purpose of raising the Public Records Doctrine as a shield cannot
be considered a valid third party purchaser. See Burns v. Jolley, 95 So. 648 (La. 1923);
First Nat'l Bank of Ruston v. Mercer, 448 So. 2d 1369 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
41. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. Following judgment on the merits, Cham-
bers moved the district court to stay its judgment pending his contemplated appeal.
Having found the purchase agreement legal, valid and enforceable, and the rejection of
the Public Records doctrine defense, the district court refused "absolutely" to grant the
stay. li. Chambers nonetheless, petitioned the fifth circuit as well as the Supreme
Court, to stay the district court's merits; however, this petition was likewise denied. In
re Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc. and G. Russell Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., No.
A-611 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1986) (order denying stay of judgment).
42. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129.
1992] 1533
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time, until the court intervened and caused the opposition to be with-
drawn.4 3 Despite the court's judgment on the merits and numerous in-
terventions, Chambers continued his refusal to close the sale of the tel-
evision station, forcing NASCO to seek judicial assistance once again
to correct the abuses."
Following oral argument on Chambers' appeal from the district
court's judgment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled and
found the appeal frivolous.45 The court imposed appellate sanctions in
the form of attorney's fees and double costs, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38, and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to determine whether further sanctions should be im-
posed for the manner in which the litigation had been conducted.4"
On remand, NASCO moved for appropriate sanctions, invoking
the district court's inherent power, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
and 28 U.S.C. section 1927.7 In considering the sanctions, the district
court first considered Rule 11.48 The district court noted the alleged
43. Id.
44. Id. During the pendency of the appeal to the fifth circuit, a dispute arose
between Chambers and NASCO over the station's equipment to be transferred under
the Purchase Agreement. NASCO Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, 894 F.2d
696, 700 (5th Cir. 1990). During the hearing regarding this dispute, Chambers and
CTR removed all of the disputed equipment, thereby violating the orders of the district
court. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 129. At the hearing, a CTR official testified that
the disputed assets were not owned by CTR, but leased from another Chambers corpo-
ration. The trial court concluded that the leases were "nothing more than instruments
of deception." Id.
45. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 122 n.4.
46. NASCO, Inc., 894 F.2d at 700. Rule 38 states that "[i]f a court of appeals
shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages, and single or
double costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
47. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 123.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 1H. As amended in 1983, this rule provides:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record. . . . The signa-
ture of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . ..
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction. . ..
1534 [Vol. 16
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sanctionable conduct was that Chambers' had: "(1) attempted to de-
prive this Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly of all which
were performed outside the confines of this Court, (2) filed false and
frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempted, by other tactics of delay, op-
pression, harassment and massive expense to reduce [NASCO] to ex-
hausted compliance.""9 The court noted that the acts alleged under
"(1)" and "(3)" could not be considered under Rule 11 as they did not
involve the certification of documents.50 Similarly, the conduct under
"(2)," the falsification of the assertions knowingly and deliberately
made by Chambers, did not become apparent until after the trial of the
merits. 51 Thus, because there was no evidence in the record establishing
the falsity of these allegations, sanctions could not have been assessed
at the time the papers were filed. 52 The court, accordingly found sanc-
tioning under Rule I 1 to be insufficient. 53 Likewise, 28 U.S.C. section
1927 was deemed inadequate to sanction Chambers' acts since the stat-
ute only applied to attorneys.54 However, the court turned to its inher-
ent power and imposed upon Chambers sanctions amounting to approx-
imately one million dollars in attorney's fees and costs incurred by
NASCO 5 In assessing the sanctions, the district court noted that
id.
49. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 138.
50. Id.
51., Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court noted that the acts alleged under "(1)" and "(3)" could not be
considered under Rule II as they did not involve the certification of documents. Id.
Similarly, the conduct under "(2)," the falsification of the assertions knowingly and
deliberately made by Chambers did not become apparent until after the trial of the
merits. Thus, because there was no evidence in the record establishing the falsity of
these allegations, sanctions could not have been assessed at the time the papers were
filed. id.
54. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139. "Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
The district court found the sanctionable conduct, alleged by NASCO, outside the
reach of section 1927 for several reasons: (I) only sanctionable acts against attorney's
could be considered; (2) the statute is not broad enough to cover acts which degrade
the judicial system (referring to the attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction, fraud,
misleading and lying to the court, and surreptitiously taping conversations with the
court); and (3) the statue only provides for excess costs and expenses and attorney's
fees. See NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139.
55. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 139. The court noted that if it finds that fraud
9
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Chambers knew throughout the proceedings that NASCO had a valid
contract, that he hired counsel to find a defense and arbitrarily refused
to perform, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for specific performance.56
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's sanctions, rejecting Chambers' argument that a federal
court sitting in diversity cannot look to the court's inherent power, but
must look to state law. 57
Subsequently, because of the importance of the issues presented,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5 The Court held
that a federal court's inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith
conduct is not displaced by the 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the various sanc-
tioning provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
even though some of the sanctionable conduct was covered by the stat-
utes and the federal rules, the court could nonetheless rely on its inher-
ent power. 59 Furthermore, federal courts sitting in diversity can assess
attorney's fees as a sanction pursuant to their inherent power even
though state law does not recognize a bad faith exception to the gen-
eral rule against fee shifting. 60 The Court reasoned that since the impo-
sition of attorney's fees pursuant to the inherent power solely vindi-
cated the abuses of process, fee shifting was a procedural and not
substantive matter. 60 Thus, the Court found that choice of law concerns
were not implicated.62
Through its broad analysis of the inherent power, the Court par-
tially sanctioned Chambers for his bad faith in the substance of the
dispute, something which the Supreme Court has never clearly sanc-
tioned. In doing so, the Court also displaced many other well estab-
has been practiced upon it, or that "the very temple of justice has been defiled," the
entire cost of the proceedings could justly be assessed against the guilty party. Id.; see
Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939); see also Universal Oil Prod.
Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1944).
56. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 143.
57. Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir.
1990). The court likewise found that neither 28 U.S.C. section 1927, nor Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 limits a court's inherent power to sanction bad faith conduct
"when the parties conduct is not within the reach of the rule or the statute." Id. at 702-
03.
58. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
59. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2138.
62. Id. at 2137-38.
1536 [Vol. 16
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lished congressionally created statutes and rules in favor of a concept
which is amorphous and lacks workable standards.
III. BACKGROUND LAW: THE AMERICAN RULE AND THE BAD
FAITH EXCEPTION
It has long been established that courts have an inherent power-a
power vested in the courts upon their creation, 3 and not derived from
any statute.64 Inherent powers have repeatedly been used to manage a
court's docket, and to regulate the conduct of the members of its bar."
Courts have also relied on this power to impose many types of sanctions
upon those who abuse the judicial process," including the assessment
of attorney's fees.6 7 Even though the American Rule prohibits fee shift-
ing in most cases,6 8 when a party has acted in bad faith, federal courts
may award such fees pursuant to their inherent equitable powers.6 9 The
inherent powers concept has often been characterized as "nebulous,"
and with "shadowy" bounds.70 Notwithstanding this observation, some
federal courts have implemented the inherent powers in three general
modes.7"
63. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 227 (1821).
64. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); United States v.
Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
65. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
66. Id.; e.g., Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30 (federal courts have the power to dismiss a
case for failure to prosecute). Also, some commentators have noted that courts occa-
sionally have disbarred, suspended or reprimanded an attorney for abuse of the judicial
process. See e.g., Michael Scott Cooper, Comment, Financial Penalties Imposed Di-
rectly Against Attorneys in Litigation Without Resort to the Contempt Power, 26
UCLA 1L. REV. 855, 856 (1979). Courts have even used their inherent powers to de-
clare attorneys absent from docket call "ready for trial," even though this could lead to
the entry of a default judgment. See e.g., Williams v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc.,
728 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1984).
67. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973).
68. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
The American Rule provides that a prevailing party must bear his own attorney's fees
and cannot have them taxed against the loser. Id. at 247.
69. Id. at 258-59; see also Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; Newman v. Piggie Park Enter.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (per curiam).
70. See R. RODES, K. RIPPLE & C. MOONEY, SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 179 n.466 (1981).
71. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.
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The first use of inherent powers springs from the congressional
creation of the lower federal courts, which vested theses lower courts
with the judicial powers pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution. 72 These inherent powers are grounded in the separation of
powers concept, because to deny this power "and yet to conceive of
courts is a self-contradiction. ' 73 The second use of inherent powers re-
gards those powers which are necessary only in the practical sense of
being useful. 4 This use of inherent power contemplates a court's use of
its power to provide it with appropriate instruments required for the
performance of its duties." The third use of inherent powers stems
from those powers that are sometimes said to arise from powers which
are " 'necessary to the exercise of all others.' "76 These powers have
historically been viewed as "essential to the administration of jus-
tice,"' 77 and "absolutely essential" to the judiciary system .7  Because
this form of inherent power emanates from absolute necessity, the
Court has noted that though this authority "may be regulated within
limits not precisely defined," it can "neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative.1 79
It is this third form of inherent power which grants a federal court
the power to control admission to its bar and discipline attorneys who
appear before it.80 Similarly, this is the basis of a court's power to pun-
72. Id. This use of inherent power encompasses a very narrow range of authority
involving activities, which are fundamental to a court as a constitutional tribunal; to
divest a court of its command within this sphere is equivalent to rendering the terms
"court" and "judicial power" meaningless. ld.; see U.S. CONST. art. III; Levin & Am-
sterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule Making. A Problem of Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1958).
73. Eash, 757 F.2d at 565. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in '7nferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separa-
tion of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV, 1010, 1023 (1924).
74. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
75. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920). An example of this use of the
court's inherent powers is (where matters are very unfamiliar to the court such as com-
plex business or scientific matters) when the court supplies itself with an auditor to aid
in its decision making, or appoints "persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties." Id. at 312.
76. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (quoting Unites States v.
Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In Roadway, the Supreme Court termed
the contempt sanction "the most prominent" of the inherent powers. Id. at 764.
77. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65.
78. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1959).
79. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66.
80. See Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
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ish for contempt;81 the power which allows a federal court to vacate its
own judgment upon proof that fraud has been committed upon it,82 and
sanction a litigant for bad faith conduct. 83 However, because of their
amorphous nature, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint
and discretion.8 ' The ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for con-
duct which abuses the judicial process is a primary aspect of this
discretion.85
In 1796, the Supreme Court first held that attorney's fees are not
recoverable as damages by a prevailing party. 6 This doctrine has come
to be known as the "American Rule" because it is considered a unique
part of the American legal system.87 This doctrine has consistently
been observed, 8 in spite of the repeated criticism, 89 and is followed in
all federal and some state courts. 90
Although the American Rule is the principal rule of law in the
81. Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 510.
82. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 11I S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991); see Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1943). The historic equity power to
set aside fraudulent judgments is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for "tamper-
ing with the administration of justice in [this] manner. . . involves far more than in-
jury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institution set up to protect and
safeguard the public." Id. at 245-46.
83. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765-67; see also Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30.
84. Id. at 764.
85. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
86. Acrambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
87. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 .U.PA. L. REV. 636, 637 (1974).
88. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
89. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the
Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). The adoption of the English rule (the
English rule generally allows a meritorious litigant to recover attorney's fees from his
adversary) in the United States has been advocated because the chance of recovering
attorney's fees from a losing opponent can create a strong incentive to take on a meri-
torious case without considering the client's ability to pay . Id. at 798. These advocates
also stress that a successful party is never fully compensated because such a party must
pay attorney's fees, which may be equal to, or greater, than the total recovery in the
suit. See Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49
IOWA L. REV. 75, 84 (1963).
90. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing
Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Strickland
v. Williams, 218 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1975); Austin Paving Co. v. Cimarron Constr., Inc.,
511 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Pelican Printing Co. v. Pecot, 216 So. 2d 153
(La. Ct. App. 1968).
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federal courts, numerous exceptions have been created. Congress has
provided a vast collection of statutes that provide for fee shifting which
are tailored to advance important legislative policies and encourage pri-
vate litigation.9 1 Furthermore, Congress has also provided for the re-
covery of attorney's fees in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 2
Even though in Sociate Internacional v. Rogers,93 the Supreme Court
stated that where misconduct is sanctionable under the federal rules
there is no need for the court to invoke its inherent powers, 9 certain
abusive behavior is simply not covered by the rules.95
The federal courts have used their inherent equitable powers to
fashion three accepted exceptions to the American Rule. 6 Of the three
91. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976); The Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976); The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); The Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976), 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980).
92. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (failure to make discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
(protective orders). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 26(g), and 37 represent some
of the enforcement power to punish discovery and judicial abuses. GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 382 (1989). See generally, FED.
R. Civ. P. 11, 26(b), (g) advisory committee's notes (1983).
93. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
94. Id. at 207. The Court noted that:
[W]hether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of non-
compliance with a production order depends exclusively upon Rule 37,
which addresses itself with particularity to the consequences of a failure to
make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ
as well as by authorizing any order which is 'just.'. . . Reliance upon ...
inherent power can only obscure analysis of the problem before us.
Id.
95. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 383.
96. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240 at 257-259. In addition to the bad faith exception, the
court's have recognized two other exceptions:
(a) Under the "common fund" exception attorney's fees are awarded
when the claimant has created, increased, or protected a fund or right
through their litigation which will directly benefit others; the shifting of
fees in this scenario is not punitive as in the bad-faith situation, but
designed to prevent unjust enrichment. Spargue v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939).
(b) Under the "prior litigation" exception a court may assess attor-
ney's fees as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court order.
Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718. This exception is applied when a person is
required, due to the wrongful act of another (i.e., as where a defendant's
breach of contract causes plaintiff to breach its contract with a third
party) to protect his interests by bringing or defending a lawsuit against a
third party. See generally, Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's Fees and the
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judicially created exceptions to the American rule, the bad faith excep-
tion is considered the most versatile" due to its punitive underlying
rationale. 8 The essential element in triggering an award of sanctions
under the bad faith exception is the existence of bad faith on the of-
fender"s behalf.99 In fact, when an exception to the American Rule is
granted, a finding of some blameworthy conduct is necessary to the
imposition of inherent power sanctions. °00 The inherent authority to
levy fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith emanates from
the traditional equitable powers of the courts' 10 ' and has been reaf-
firmed as an inherent supervisory power on numerous occasions. 102
However, as much as the bad faith exception to the American Rule
seems to be purely compensatory, 103 it is not, since the imposition of a
sanction does not depend on who prevails, but on how the parties con-
duct themselves during the litigation.'
One cannot deny that all of the exceptions to the American rule
serve a compensatory function as they recompense a party for actual
Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319, 322 (1977).
97. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorney's Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System,
61 N.C.L. REV. 613, 630 (1983).
98. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5; see also Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
663 F.2d 178, 180 (1980).
99. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 765-66 (1980); Alyeska, 421
U.S. at 258-59; Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d
451, 455 (7th Cir. (1987); Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 180.
100. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 620 (stating
that when the blameworthy conduct consists of some abuse of the judicial process, the
exceptions may compensate the individual injured by the abuse, but the interest which
is exonerated is the preservation of judicial authority and resources).
101. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245. The courts of equity in the United States
were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, and given the power possessed by the Eng-
lish chancery courts at the time the United States Constitution was adopted. Act of
September 27, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; Fountain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 Haw.) 369,
384 (1854) (since the equity courts in England possessed discretionary power to award
attorney's fees for bad faith conduct, these same powers were seized by the United
States federal equity courts upon their creation). See generally Guardian Trust Co.v.
Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241-46 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281
U.S. 1 (1930). Included in this equitable authority was the power to deter frivolous
litigation, to punish for abuse of the judicial system and to avoid injustice to litigants.
See Note, supra note 96, at 323-24. As these goals epitomize the underlying rational of
the federal bad faith exception, they are clearly within a court's equity powers. Hall,
412 U.S. at 5.
102. E.g., Roadway, 447 U.S. at 765; Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240, 259.
103. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 n.17 (1978).
104. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2132, 2137 (1991).
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and out of pocket costs.""5 However, the imposition of sanctions under
the bad faith exception actually serves a dual purpose."' A fee
awarded under the court's inherent power upon a finding of bad faith
not only makes the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his
opponent's obstinacy, but also vindicates judicial authority without hav-
ing to resort to sanctions available for contempt. 10 7 Therefore, any
compensatory effect the bad faith exception results in is subordinate or
ancillary to other policies which compensate some litigants but not
others for their expenses in bringing lawsuits.'
The bad faith exception consists primarily of bad faith which pre-
cedes or induces litigation, 0 9 and bad faith which occurs during litiga-
tion. 1 Both instances of bad faith can encompass three varieties of
misconduct which amount to abuse of the judicial system: obdurate or
obstinate conduct which causes legal action;"' substantive bad faith in
propounding a frivolous claim, counterclaim, or defense; 1 2 and vexa-
tious conduct during the course of litigation." 3
Bad faith which precedes or induces litigation arises when a de-
105. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 619-620.
106. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 639 n.14.
107. id.
108. Id.
109. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15. Heucker v. Milburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 n.9 (6th
Cir. 1976); see also Browning Debentures Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d
1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1979).
110. Hall, 412 U.S. at 15.
111. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 689 n.14; Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962);
Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 418 F. Supp 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598, 606. (5th Cir. 1974).
112. See, e.g., Roadway, 447 U.S. 752; Alyeska, 421 U.S. 240; F.D. Rich Co.
Inc. v. United States ex rel Indus. Trial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974) (supporting
the power to sanction for the assertion of a substantive bad faith claim). Ellingson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1331-32 (9th Cir. 1981) (frivolous appeal). But see
Nemroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980); Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman,
523 F. Supp. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
113. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 764-66 (this aspect of the bad faith exception pro-
tects the orderly administration of the legal process). Many courts which impose sanc-
tions pursuant to their inherent power fail to specify the detail of the power, or use this
generic term to describe several distinguishable branches of this power. Eash, 757 F.2d
at 561-62. Consequently, vigorous litigation in an area of the law, which is unsettled,
should not be equated with "obduracy, wantonness, or vexatiousness." Adams v. Carl-
son, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975). However, such litigation practices in matters
which are relatively settled may constitute abuses of the judicial system and add up to
the entry of sanctions on a punitive basis. id.
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fendant, without any valid justification, refuses to recognize the clear
legal right of the plaintiff, and forces the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit to
enforce his rights."" In this situation fee shifting occurs due to the un-
fairness imposed on a party, who should have freely enjoyed his rights,
but had to pay the cost of litigation to do so.115 The gravamen of a.
party's obstinacy is the consumption of private and judicial resources,
and as the Supreme Court stated in Hutto v. Finney, such an award
"vindicates the . . . Court's authority over a recalcitrant litigant,"
while sending the message that, protracted litigation will not be
tolerated."'
Several cases demonstrate how a party's pre-litigation conduct can
lead to the imposition of attorney's fees where an opponent refuses to
recognize a valid right. In Vaughan v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court
awarded attorney's fees in a suit brought by a seaman for his em-
ployer's failure to respond to a claim for maintenance and cure." 7 The
Court awarded the seaman attorney's fees under the rubric of compen-
satory damages."" However, the Court stressed that the employer's
callous attitude in not even making an investigation into the claim
forced the seaman to hire counsel to enforce his rights." 9
Similarly, in Bell v. School Board,20 . the defendant school board
had not integrated despite the fact that nine years had passed since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.'2' The
school board had resisted the transfer of black students by creating
complicated transfer procedures applied only to blacks. 22 In granting
injunctive relief, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the
long pattern of evasion and obstruction practiced by the school
board. 2' The court noted that the award of fees was based on the de-
114. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15.(1973); see, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527 (1962).
115. See Comment, note 87, at 660-61.
116. Hutto, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (the defendant's obstinacy was found in their
failure to remedy constitutional violations which had been found earlier in the
proceedings).
117. 369 U.S. 527, 528 (1967).
118. Id. at 530.
119. Id. at 530-31; see also Lewis, 418 F. Supp. at 28 (the court noted that
Texaco's unjustified and unsupported refusal to pay knowing of its obligation "was
sheer recalcitrance and an act of bad faith" on its part).
120. 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. Bell, 321 F.2d at 500.
123. Id.
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fendant's long continued pattern of evasion, and the defendants refusal
to take initiative and by interposing administrative obstacles to thwart
the plaintiff's valid rights.""
In 1974, NAACP v. Allen 25 illustrated another application of the
bad faith exception to non-litigation conduct. In Allen, a finding of bad
faith was based on the fact that in the thirty-seven year existence of
the Alabama Trooper organization, not one black had ever been a
trooper, but had only been employed by the Department in a non-merit
system. 26 The court awarded attorney's fees since it was more than
apparent that the Department understood that its acts were unconstitu-
tional, but it continued to maintain a defense in the lawsuit which
amounted to unreasonable and obdurate conduct.
12 7
Subsequently, in 1975 the Supreme Court decided Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society. 28 In Alyeska, environmental
groups sued the Secretary of the Interior in an attempt to prevent the
issuance of permits to the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company for the
construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 129 With the merits of the
litigation settled,130 the Court addressed whether Alyeska could be re-
quired to pay one-half of the environmental group's award due to the
group having performed the functions of a private attorney general.' 31
The Supreme Court held that a court, pursuant to its inherent power,
may assess attorney's fees as a sanction when "the losing party has
'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive rea-
sons.' "132 However, this language does not necessarily embrace the
reasoning of Bell or Allen.13 3 Awarding attorney's fees for bad faith
124. Id.
125. 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affid, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
Plaintiffs brought suit against the Alabama Department of Public of Safety and the
Alabama Personnel Department under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging the unconstitu-
tional exclusion of blacks from employment in the Public Safety Department. Id. at
705. The court awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to
the American rule. Id. at 707-10.
126. Id. at 708.
127. Id.
128. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
129. Id. at 241.
130. Id. at 244-245. Congress had enacted legislation which amended the Min-
eral Leasing Act allowing the granting of the permits sought by Alyeska. Id. at 244.
131. Id. at 246.
132. Id. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Indus. Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
133. See Bell, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703; see also,
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conduct causing the original dispute must be distinguished from an
award of fees for bad faith which unjustifiably opposes a clear claim.""
A fee award in the later instance protects the judicial system against
unwarranted expenditures of its resources, whereas an award in the for-
mer situation punishes a party for his role in the substance of the dis-
pute. 35 Although such an award falls within a court's equitable pow-
ers, this can present a confusing overlap when a party is also awarded
punitive damages.' 36
The Supreme Court has not explicitly read the bad faith exception
to include bad faith conduct causing the original dispute' until the
Chambers decision. 3 8 However, Supreme Court cases and other lower
federal court cases do suggest that some form of misconduct beyond a
determination of fault in the facts that give rise to the cause of action
is required for an award of fees under the bad faith exception.' 39 Some
commentators suggest that such an expansion of the court's inherent
powers under the bad faith exception could lead to fee shifting in the
ordinary tort or contract case in which the only bad faith is in the
cause of action itself.'40
MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634.
134. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634-35.
135. Id. at 635 (suggesting that such an award is tantamount to an award of
punitive damages); see Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir.
1976).
136. See Hon. James L. Oakes, Introduction: A Brief Glance at Attorney's After
Alyeska, 2 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 169, 175-76 (1979).
137. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier, 385 U.S. 714, 719 (1967) (hold-
ing that the defendant's deliberate violation of a trademark did not fall within any of
the judicially created exceptions of the American Rule); see also Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 183-84 (1976) (rejecting that the mere determination of fact against a
party did not prove the threshold of conduct for which a penalty would be justified).
138. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc, Ill S. Ct. 2132, 2138 (1991) (stating that
it did not impose sanctions for Chambers' breach of contract, but for the fraud he
perpetrated on the court). However, the dissent believes the Court appears to have
disclaimed that its holding does reach this aspect of pre-litigation conduct. Id. at 2147
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2138 nn. 16-17.
139. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979) (defendant's non-litigation conduct was "intolerable"; however, there
was no showing of bad faith in defending the suit); Straub, 540 F.2d at 599-60 (revers-
ing an award of attorney's fees in a lOb-5 action when bad faith existed solely in the
acts which gave rise to the cause of action).
140. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 636 (suggesting deterrence to such conduct
and adequate incentive to sue already exists through the imposition of compensatory
and punitive damages).
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Another theory under which courts have awarded attorney's fees is
when a party's conduct during the course of litigation results in need-
less expenditures. This corollary of the bad faith exception focuses on a
party's abuse of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.141 Because the
procedural rules and practices provide an unlimited opportunity for de-
lay and harassment, several reasons have been suggested as to why
judges seem more willing to make a finding of bad faith on an objective
basis when procedural abuses are alleged. 42 First, judges are in a posi-
tion to observe a party's procedural moves first hand.143 Second, as
judges are versed in procedural matters, they can easily compare a
party's procedural maneuvers to the norm in order to determine if they
are propounding needless litigation. 44 Also, since the principles which
govern the procedural rules in the federal courts are usually much
clearer than in certain areas of substantive law, procedural abuses are
monitored easier.145
Finally, the "substantive" bad faith exception to the American
rule is designed to compensate, punish, and deter the harm done to
courts and private parties by the assertion of frivolous claims. 46 Theo-
retically, this corollary of the bad faith exception was intended to de-
crease the amount of groundless litigation since a party who asserts a
groundless claim, counterclaim, or defense may be accountable for the
share of litigation attributable to litigating the bad faith claim, 1' 7 or for
the entire cost if bad faith pervades the entire lawsuit. 1 4 However,
some have criticized the American Rule saying it not only fails to deter
such litigation, but encourages claims which are not even colorable.'4 9
141. Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1980); see also Browning Debentures Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,
1088-89 (2d Cir. 1979).
142. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 645.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Browning, 560 F..2d at 1088; see Comment, Nemroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith,
and Awards of Attorney's Fees, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 468, 481-83 (1979) (application of
this branch is similar to the tort of malicious prosecution.); GLENN EUGENE DAVIS,
Prevailing Defendant Fee Awards in Civil Rights Litigation: A Growing Threat to
Private Enforcement, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 75, 111 (1982).
147. Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181 n.21; Browning, 569 F.2d at 1088-89.
148. See Ellingson, 653 F.2d 1327 (awarding attorney's fees for defense of main
action and frivolous appeal).
149. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 87, at 797. Courts have noted that in order
for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the courts' inherent power, there must be
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A review of case law illustrates that although courts apply objective
standards for the bad faith exception to a party's pre-litigation conduct,
much more is required to establish a party's bad faith assertion of a
substantive claim or defense.'
In Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,'51 the plaintiff was
found to have abused the judicial process and to have harassed the de-
fendants. 152 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the plain-
tiff's bad faith was based in his filing of a new suit, which was
grounded on "sham" pleadings containing false allegations, and which
had been resolved against him over twenty years earlier.'53 However,
subsequent case law suggests that if a claim was colorable when initi-
ated, it might not be found to have been brought in bad faith. 54 In
Nemroff v. Abelson,5" the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
an award of attorney's fees imposed on the plaintiff for having filed a
lawsuit consisting largely of inadmissable and irrelevant evidence.' 56
The court stated that a claim is colorable, for purposes of bad faith,
when it has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the
reasonable belief of the individual making the claim. 157 Furthermore,
the court noted that the test is "whether a reasonable attorney could
have concluded that the facts supporting the claim might be estab-
lished, not whether such facts actually had been established."158
In contrast, the court in Miracle Mile Associates v. City of Roch-
clear evidence that the challenged actions were entirely without color and made for
reasons of harassment, delay or other improper purposes; see, e.g., Adams, 521 F.2d
168.
150. Browning, 569 F.2d at 1087-88 (a substantive claim brought in bad faith
must be entirely with out color, based on an objective bases, and brought with improper
purposes, which is a subjective analysis); see also Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d
1284, 1287 (10th Cir. 1986).
151. 653 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 1331-32.
153. Id. T court also imposed fees on the plaintiff for his prosecution of a
groundless appeal stating that "a frivolous lawsuit does not become meritorious when
appealed." Id. at 1332.
154. See, e.g., Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181; Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 348; Browning, 560
F.2d at 1088.
155. 469 F. Supp 630, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), af/'d in part, rev'd in part, 620
F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. Nemroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. Id. at 348.
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
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ester'159 awarded attorney's fees to the defendants' based on a finding
that the plaintiffs' claim was frivolous and made in bad faith. 160 On
appeal, the court reversed the award, rejecting a contention that the
plaintiff's bad faith was shown because of the weaker merits of the
current case than the merits of previous cases brought under the same
theory where recovery was barred. 6'
It follows that the application of the substantive bad faith excep-
tion requires an objective determination as to whether a reasonable at-
torney had any legal or factual support for making the claim.' 2 If the
claim is found to have support, it could not have been made in bad
faith. If the claim lacked support, a court must then determine if the
litigant had an improper purpose. 6 3 In addition, the substantive bad
faith exception requires more than a showing that a party did not pre-
vail on the merits of a claim, defense or position." 4
Because the objective determination is often difficult to establish,
the standard usually is exercised in the most extreme circumstances.' 65
Some indicia of substantive bad faith recognized by federal courts in-
clude claims or defenses advanced which "were meritless, that counsel
knew or should have known this . . . and that the motive for filing was
for an improper purpose, such as harassment."' 66 Furthermore, sub-
stantive bad faith can even be inferred from a particular set of facts. 67
159. 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 19. The plaintiff, lessees and developers of a proposed shopping area,
brought an antitrust action against the city, city officials and a commercial competitor,
but these plaintiffs had brought a similar action on the same theory and lost. Id. at 20.
161. Id. at 21.
162. Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 348.
163. Browning, 560 F.2d at 1088 (harassment and delay are improper purposes).
164. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 389.
165. Health-Chem Corp. v. Hyman, 523 F. Supp. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
166. Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local No. 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1375
(6th Cir. 1987).
167. Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987).
Examples of when substantive bad faith has been inferred:
(a) Under the threat of numerous depositions. See Browning, 560 F.2d at 1089; In
re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 989 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1108 (1988).
(b) When filing actions plainly barred by res judicata or other preclusion doc-
trines. See Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1986); Di Silvestro
v. United States, 767 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 862 (1985).
(c) When allowing a bankruptcy appeal to the district court "to atrophy for more
than nine months [after a brief was due], failing to properly respond to a court order
[to support their appeal or face dismissal], and then failing to respond to a motion to
dismiss." In re AOV Indus., 798 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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However, the mere length of litigation, 68 and the loss on the merits has
been held inadequate to demonstrate sanctionable bad faith conduct."'
Not surprisingly, the standard against which a substantive bad
faith exception is found is very high.170 There must be "clear evidence"
that the challenged actions are without color and are taken for reasons
of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes.1 7' Several
courts have indicated that this rigorous standard is necessary to ensure
that plaintiffs with meritorious or colorable, but novel, claims are not
deterred from bringing suit.172 Without such a standard, those with
meritorious claims may be deterred in their access to the judicial sys-
tem while those who know, because of their improper motives, that a
suit is impermissible, continue to abuse the judicial process and its
resources.'173
An increasing number of state statutes and court rules which per-
mit or require fee-shifting in specific instances have essentially done
away with the American Rule. 74 This trend questions the ability that a
federal court sitting in diversity has to impose a fee award pursuant to
its inherent power, 75 since a court may characterize a fee-shifting pro-
vision as either substantive or procedural. 76 In Alyeska, 77 after the
Court discussed the American rule and the bad faith exception, it
noted that when a federal court sits in a diversity case, a different situ-
(d) Engaging in dilatory tactics during discovery and courtroom proceedings, fail-
ing to meel scheduled deadlines, and misleading the court. Lipsig, 663 F.2d at 181-82.
168. Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 250 (1st Cir), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1021 (1985) (admiralty setting).
169. Autorama, 802 F.2d at 1288.
170. Adams, 521 F.2d at 170.
171. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983); accord Autorama, 802 F.2d at 1287-88; Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
172. Nemroff, 620 F.2d at 349-50; Browning, 560 F.2d at 1088.
173. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 642.
174. Note, State Attorney fee shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 323 (1984). The survey revealed
1,974 attorney fee-shifting statutes in the code of 50 states.
175. See JOSEPH, supra note 92, at 376.
176. Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee Shifting Laws: Further
Substance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 393,
414 (1988). Attorney fee-shifting statues may be classified into two groups: (1) proce-
dural or general litigation statutes which discourage abuse of the judicial process; (2)
non-procedural statutes which seek to protect certain parties. Id.
177. 421 U.S. 250, 259 n.31 (1975).
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ation occurs.17 8 In footnote thirty-one, the Court stated that " 'in an
ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a
valid federal statute or rule of court, . . . state law denying the right to
attorney's fees or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial
policy of the state, should be followed.' "179
However, some federal courts in diversity settings have misinter-
preted this language and have applied this limitation not only to fee
shifting rules that embody a substantive policy of the state, but to pro-
cedural fee-shifting laws as well.180 These courts have held that even
though federal courts can use their inherent powers to assess attorney's
fees as a sanction in some cases, they cannot do so in a diversity setting
unless applicable state laws recognize a bad faith exception to the
American rule prohibiting fee shifting."" Tryforos v. Icarian Dev.
Co.,"' represents one instance where a federal court sitting as a state
court erroneously applied a state procedural fee-shifting law. In this
case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered section forty-one
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,18 and denied a request for attorney's
fees. 8 ' However, the court's denial was not based on a determination
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting 6 J. MOORE, Federal Practice 54.77 [2] pp. 1712-13 (2d ed.
1974)). The Court considered only the situation in which state law might permit attor-
neys' fees while a federal court would not and concluded that such an award would be
permissible in a diversity action when necessary to effectuate a substantial policy of the
state. Id.
180. See PARNESS, supra, note 176. (contending that state laws on attorney's fees
which are procedural in nature are inapplicable in diversity cases). The author notes
that lower federal courts which sit as state courts should not utilize footnote thirty-one
as authority for applying all state fee shifting laws, but must distinguish between sub-
stantive and procedural provisions. Id.
181. See Tryforos v. Icarian Dev. Co., 518 F.2d 1258, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Mantana v. Tryforos. 423 U.S. 1091 (1976); Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764, 773 (2d Cir. 1980).
182. 518 F.2d 1258.
183. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110 § 41 (1973) provided:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and good
faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred, by the other party by
reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to
be summarily taxed by the court at trial.
id.
With recent amendments, the Illinois law now conforms to Rule II of the Federal rules
of Civil Procedure. See ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110 § 2-611 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
184. Tryforos, 518 F.2d at 1265-66.
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that section forty-one was procedural and therefore inapplicable in fed-
eral court. The court drew no distinction between state fee shifting laws
which do and do not reflect a substantial policy of the state.1"' Rather,
the court held that the lower court's findings did not indicate that the
suit was brought in bad faith, and thus the conduct did not fall within
the ambit of section forty-one.186 The court rejected that the lower
court's award was nonetheless supportable under the exception to the
American Rule, relying on footnote 31 in Alyeska. 8 7 Lower federal
courts should not interpret footnote thirty-one as authority for applying
procedural fee shifting laws in a diversity context, but should interpret
footnote thirty-one as requiring deference only to state substantive law.
As previously discussed, federal courts are interpreting footnote
thirty-one as requiring application of all state fee shifting provisions in
diversity cases, whether procedural or substantive. Furthermore, fed-
eral courts are also excluding the federal procedural common law
which allows fee shifting in those rare cases, such as the bad faith
exception. 188
Historically, Erie broadly commanded federal courts sitting in di-
versity cases to apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law. 89 After the 1945 case of Guaranty Trust Company. v. York,19
the Supreme Court required federal courts in diversity cases to use
state law if application of federal laws would significantly affect the
outcome of the litigation.1 91 Then, in 1965 the Supreme Court decided
Hanna v. Plumer192 and held that where no federal rule controls and
choice of law analysis is necessary, the outcome determination test as
established in Guaranty Trust Co. "cannot be read without reference
to the twin aims of the Erie rule-discouragement of forum shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 1 93
Some federal courts in diversity cases have failed to undertake the
necessary Erie analysis in determining whether application of a court's
inherent power to tax fees for bad faith conduct is a matter of substan-
185. Id. at 1266-67.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1256 n.27.
188. See PARNESS, supra note 176, at 415 n.117.
189. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
190. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
191. Id. at 109.
192. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
193. Id. at 468.
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tive or procedural law.1 94 Such an analysis requires consideration of the
twin aims of Erie, as well as thoughtful deliberation on the character of
the misconduct for which a court is sanctioning a party. The misread-
ing of footnote thirty-one infringes upon the power of a federal court to
regulate procedure in federal courts. Furthermore, relying on footnote
thirty-one for the proposition that where a state does not recognize a
bad faith exception to the American Rule, federal courts may not in-
voke a federal common law exception is erroneous. Although federal
courts are limited to using state substantive law in diversity settings,
use of its inherent powers to vindicate abuses of the judicial system is
essentially procedural in nature. Thus, by implication, federal courts
using their inherent powers to engage in fee shifting under the bad
faith exception can circumvent this limitation. Additionally, in a diver-
sity context, the bad faith exception merely regulates the manner in
which substantive rights are enforced in federal courts, and has no out-
come determination implications. 1 5 This necessarily makes fee shifting
procedural so that state substantive law cannot prevent fee shifting. Fi-
nally, the federal interest in curtailing misconduct in federal courts
through sanctions, such as the bad faith exception to the American
Rule, does not contravene with the policy of states adhering to a differ-
ent rule. 196 Thus, federal courts hearing state law claims should only
apply state substantive fee-shifting laws, otherwise, federal procedural
law controls.
IV. THE CHAMBERS COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
The Chambers9 " case presented the Supreme Court with the op-
portunity to continue shaping the scope of federal courts' inherent pow-
ers in sanctioning a litigant for bad faith conduct. The court granted
certiorari, and Justice White, writing for the five member majority,
194. See PARNESS, supra text accompanying note 176.
195. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 705-
06 (5th Cir. 1990). Under circumstance where a federal court is assessing fees as a
means to vindicate judicial abuses or in an effort to control the litigation, the exercise
of inherent power does not encourage forum shopping or inequitable administration of
the laws. Id.
196. See PARNESS, supra, note 176 at 415 n.117.
197. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
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concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in assessing
NASCO's attorney's fees to Chambers for his bad faith conduct.' 98
The Court began it discussion by noting that federal courts have
the inherent power to manage and control their own proceedings and
the conduct of those who appear before them.'99 Outlining the scope of
the inherent power, the Court also noted that this power allows a fed-
eral court to vacate its own judgment upon a finding that fraud has
been perpetrated on the court.2"' The majority stated that although the
American Rule prohibits fee shifting in most cases, federal courts have
created exceptions to this in narrowly defined circumstances. 20' The
majority's analysis of the exceptions resulted in a determination that
when a party acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons, a court may assess attorney's fees against them by use of their
inherent powers . 2 The Court reasoned that when a party practices
fraud upon the court,203 or delays or disrupts the litigation or inhibits
the enforcement of a court order,20' the imposition of sanctions serves
the dual purposes of vindicating judicial authority and making the pre-
vailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponents obstinacy.20 5
Chambers' claimed that the sanctioning scheme of the federal
statutes and rules displaced the inherent power to sanction a litigant
198. Id. at 2128 (Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Conner, JJ.,
joined).
199. Id. at 2132 (referring to United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,
34 (1812)); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Link v. Wa-
bash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204,
227 (1821).
200. Chambers, 111 S. Ct at 2132. A federal court has the power to control
admission to its bar and discipline attorneys who appear before it. See Ex Parte Burr,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824). Also, a federal court has the power to punish for
contempt. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798
(1987). Quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944),
the Chambers Court noted that this "'historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently
begotten judgments is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for tampering with the
administration of justice in [this] manner. . .involves far more than an injury to a
single litigant. It is a wrong against the institution .... . Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at
2132.
201. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2132-33.
202. Id. (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974) and Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)).
203. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2133 (citing Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root
Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)).
204. Id. at 2133 (citing to Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)).
205. Id.
1992] 1553
27
Rotbart: Sanctions and the Inherent Power: The Supreme Court Expands the A
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
for bad faith conduct.2 °6 In addressing Chambers' claim, the opinion
considered five factors in determining whether any basis existed for
holding that the inherent powers to sanction for bad faith conduct are
displaced by the scheme of the federal statutes and rules.20 7
First, the Court took into account that the inherent power extends
to a full range of litigation abuses, whereas the other sanctioning provi-
sions only reaches specific individuals or acts. 208 Thus, the inherent
power must continue to fill the gaps of the statutes and rules.20 9 Sec-
ond, the majority considered the different standards under which sanc-
tions may be imposed. The Court noted that the exceptions to the
American Rule limit a court's inherent power to engage in fee shifting
to instances where a litigant has engaged in bad faith conduct or willful
disobedience of a court order.210 Conversely, many of the other sanc-
tioning schemes allow imposing sanctions for conduct which merely
fails to meet a reasonableness standard." Consequently, the majority
reasoned risk would be limited when courts invoke their inherent power
to deter the advocacy of litigants attempting to vindicate federal
rights. 212
Third, the majority conceded that the exercise of inherent powers
could be limited by Congress since the lower federal courts were cre-
ated by acts of congress. 21 3 However, the majority refused to acknowl-
edge that Congress intended to depart from so well an established prin-
ciple,21' the existence and scope of which has been reaffirmed since the
206. Id. at 2134. Chambers argued that 28 U.S.C. section 1927, and the many
sanctioning mechanisms in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reveals a legislative
intent to obviate or foreclose resort to the inherent powers. Id. at 2131-32.
207. Id. at 2134-35.
208. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2134 n. 11. For example, Rule II imposes an objective standard of a
reasonable inquiry which does not require any bad faith findings. Id. at 2134. Rule I I
was amended in 1983 because its subjective bad faith standard was difficult to estab-
lish, and courts were reluctant to invoke it. See Advisory committee notes on the 1983
amendment to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 575-76. Thus, to the extent that the risk in
"chill[ing] the advocacy of litigants attempting to vindicate federal rights," exists when
invoking the inherent power, this risk occurs no less than when a court invokes Rule 11.
Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134 n.l1.
213. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134.
214. Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcello, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)); Aly-
eska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 (determining that
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most recent amendments to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. section 1927.215
Fourth, the majority considered the .Advisory Committee Notes on the
1983 Amendment to Rule 11. These notes stated that the Rule
"build[s] upon and expand[s] the equitable doctrine permitting the
court to award. . .attorney's fees to a litigant whose opponent acts in
bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation."2 6 Thus, the majority
reasoned that Rule 11 does not alter the authority a federal court has
to manage abuses under its inherent authority. 17
Lastly, the majority considered case law involving the federal rules
and the inherent powers. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Company,' 8 the
Supreme Court recognized that a federal court has the inherent power
to dismiss a case sue sponte for failure to prosecute, despite the lan-
guage of Rule 41(b) appearing to require a motion from a party. 19 In
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,22 the Court remanded for considera-
tion of sanctions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3721 and
the court's inherent authority after determining that 28 U.S.C. § 1927
would riot allow the assessment of fees.222 Based on these cases, the
Court held that the inherent power can still be invoked even if rules
exist which sanction the same conduct.223
The majority concluded that nothing ratified the presumption that
the federal rules and statutes displace or obviate reliance on a court's
inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad faith
"Congress ha[d] not repudiated the judicially fashioned exceptions" to fee shifting,
which were based in the inherent powers of the courts).
215. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134; see also FED. R. Civ, P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's notes (1983).
216. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
217. Id. at 2135 (citing Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir.
1986)).
218. 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962).
219. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2135. The Court noted that it would require a
much more lucid demonstration of reason than rule 41(b) to accept that it was in-
tended to abrogate the inherent powers of the court (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630-32);
see FED. IR,. Civ. P. 41(b).
220. 447 U.S. 752, 755 (1980).
221. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides for an order compelling discov-
ery and the failure to answer, or an evasive answer, to such an order may be grounds
for an award of expenses for the motion, and/or ground for sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P.
37.
222. Roadway, 447 U.S. at 767.
223. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2135.
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conduct.22 However, the Court reasoned that ordinarily when the con-
duct at issue could be sanctioned under the rules, rather than the inher-
ent power, reliance should be placed in the rules.2 5 Thus, "when
neither the statutes nor the rules are up to the task, the court may rely
on [its] inherent power. '"226
The Court then addressed whether there was any abuse of discre-
tion in resorting to the inherent power. The majority conceded that the
district court could have used Rule 11 and some of the other rules to
sanction Chambers for his misconduct .2 2  Even though much of Cham-
bers conduct was beyond the reach of Rule 11, section 1927, and many
of the other sanctioning provisions, his conduct throughout the suit
evinced bad faith; the conduct which the rules covered was intertwined
with conduct that only the inherent powers could address.228 Also, hav-
ing to resort to the rules for certain violations before applying the in-
herent power would only have created extensive satellite litigation,
which is contrary to the aim of the rules. 2 9
After finding no abuse of discretion in relying on the inherent
power, the Court examined whether a district court, sitting in diversity,
could impose attorney's fees in a state which does not recognize the bad
faith exception to the American Rule.230 The Court referred to footnote
thirty-one in Alyeska,23' and interpreted the limitation on federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply only to fee shifting laws which em-
bodies a substantive state policy and does not limit federal procedural
laws. 23 2 Only where a conflict exists among state and federal substan-
tive laws does the Erie problem arise. 33 The Court found neither of the
twin aims of Erie implicated by sanctioning Chambers for his disobedi-
224. Id. The Court's conclusion was in light of the fact that the conduct at issue
was not covered by the other sanctioning provisions. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2136.
227. Id.
228. Chambers, 11l S. Ct. at 2136.
229. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes on the amend-
ment to Rule 11 (1983).
230. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2136. For example, as a general rule, attorney's
fees are not allowed to a successful litigant in Louisiana except where authorized by
statute or contract. Rutherford v. Impson, 366 So. 2d 944, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
231. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.
232. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136. A state statute which permits a prevailing
party in certain types of suits to recover attorney's fees may embody a substantive state
policy. See People of Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U.S. 238 (1928).
233. Chambers, I1l S. Ct. at 2137.
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ence of court orders and his attempt to defraud the court. 234 The award
of attorney's fees is akin to a remedial fine for civil contempt since it
vindicates a courts authority over a recalcitrant litigant. The majority
viewed the impositions of attorney's fees as a sanction for Chambers'
fraud on the court, and his bad faith toward his adversary and the
court throughout the proceedings. 235 Thus, it reasoned the inherent
power to tax fees for this conduct could not be subservient to the state's
policy without transgressing the limits of Erie,236 Guarantee Trust
Company,237 and Hanna,3 ' since "fee shifting in this instance was
matter of vindicating judicial authority," which is procedural, and not
a substantive remedy.239 Thus, the Court agreed with the appellate
court that the inherent power to assess fees in response to punishing for
abuse of the judicial process was a procedural response well within the
powers set forth in Erie,2 40 and not substantive.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion, dissented primarily because
of his disagreement with the majority's characterization of the scope of
the inherent powers.241 Justice Scalia did not agree that the inherent
power to sanction a litigant reaches conduct "beyond the court's con-
fines regardless of whether such obedience interfered with the conduct
of the trial. 24 2
Justice Kennedy's dissent was joined by Justice Souter and Chief
Justice Rehnquist.243 Justice Kennedy and the dissenters accepted that
234. Id. The Court noted that the imposition of sanctions under the bad faith
exception depends not on which party wins the lawsuit, but on the parties' conduct
during the course of the litigation; thus, the Court found that the exception does not
lead to forum shopping. Id. The Court also found it was not inequitable to apply the
exception to citizens and noncitizens, since a party has the ability to determine whether
sanctions will be assessed by acting accordingly. Id.
235. Id. at 2138.
236. 304 U.S. at 64
237. 326 U.S. at 99.
238. 380 U.S. at 468.
239. Id. at 2138; see NASCO, Inc., 894 F.2d at 705.
240. 304 U.S. at 64.
241. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2141 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
242. Id. Justice Scalia was referring to what he believed the district court ap-
peared to have sanctioned Chambers for his flagrant bad faith breach of contract. Id.
243. Chambers, I11 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, Souter, Ji., and Rehnquist, C.J.,
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Chambers engaged in sanctionable conduct. However, they did not
agree that the inherent powers could be invoked without first resorting
to the federal rules and statutes.2" Furthermore, they opposed using
the inherent power to sanction Chambers for his bad faith breach of
contract. 45 Justice Kennedy stated that the American Rule recognizes
that Congress has defined and provided more than adequate rules and
statutes which enable the federal courts to curtail abuses. 2" It was also
argued that by allowing federal courts to exercise their inherent power
even when rules exist which sanction the same conduct, the Court is
treating the inherent powers as the norm and the legislative basis of
authority as the exception." 7 The reasoning of the dissent was that the
exercise of inherent power to sanction a bad faith litigant stems from
that power which is necessary to permit the courts to function.248 Thus,
the dissents' position was that inherent powers should only be exercised
when congressional powers fail to protect the process of the court and
that there is no need to use the inherent powers if a rule or statute
provides a basis for sanctions.24 9
Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for ignoring prior prece-
dent and misreading others. He noted that in prior cases, federal courts
could not invoke their inherent power when a rule existed which cov-
ered the same conduct.25° He argued that the majority's reliance on
dissenting).
244. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2141-42. For example, a district court can sanction a party and/or his
attorney for a baseless discovery request. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). A district court can
award expenses and/or contempt damages when a party presents an affidavit in a sum-
mary judgment motion in bad faith, or for purposes of delay. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g). A
district court can punish contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §
401 (1988). A district court can award costs, expenses, and attorney's fees against
attorneys who multiply proceeding vexatiously. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988).
247. Id. at 2142-43.
248. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143. Of the three possible bases of inherent
power, the dissent is referring to the power necessary to preserve the authority of the
court; "[TIhose which are necessary to the exercise of all others." Id. (quoting Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
249. Id. at 2141.
250. Id. at 2143. In Societe Int'l Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958), the Court held that the power to dis-
miss a complaint due to noncompliance with a production order depends solely on Rule
37. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988), the Court held
a federal court could not employ its inherent power to bypass the harmless error in-
quiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a).
1558 [Vol. 16
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 15
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/15
Rotbart
Roadway and Link were misplaced.2"1 He also observed that in Road-
way, the decision did not even discuss the relation between Rule 37 and
the inherent powers,23 2 while in Link, the issue centered on the permis-
sive language in Rule 41(b).2 53 Consequently, the dissent explained
that since Federal Rules 11 and 26(g) are cast in mandatory terms,
they require the imposition of sanctions when litigants violate the certi-
fication. standards.2"" The dissent urged that these standards give a liti-
gant notice of the proscribed conduct and make review for misuse of
discretion possible.2 55 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the major-
ity's bad faith standard fails to inform litigants as to what is required
and therefore violates the mandates of due process.2 6
The dissent observed that by resorting to the inherent power when-
ever conduct sanctionable under the rules is intertwined with conduct
only sanctionable by inherent power, severe consequences would fol-
low.257 Such consequences are: federal courts would be encouraged to
find bad faith conduct and eliminate the need to rely on specific textual
provisions; the uncertain development of the meaning and scope of ex-
press sanctioning provisions; and the defeat of Congress' goal in the
enactment of the Federal Rules- uniformity in the federal courts.2 58
Justice Kennedy suggested that the district court could have relied
upon many. other sources of authority to award attorney's fees for the
abuse of its process.2"9
251. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143.
252. Id. at 2144. The majority cited Roadway for the proposition that the inher-
ent power of a court can be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the
same conduct. Id. at 2135 (citing Roadway, where the Court remanded for a consider-
ation of sanctions under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and the inherent
power); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. at 752, 767 (1980).
253. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2144 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Link held that
neither the permissive language of Rule 41(b) nor its policy abrogated the inherent
power of a court to dismiss a case sua sponte. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630 (1962).
254. Id. at 2144-45. Justice Kennedy thereby concluded that the rules them-
selves dispose of the idea that they may be discarded in the discretion of a court. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2145.
257. Id.
258. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2146-47.
259. Id. at 2146-47. Justice Kennedy observed that Rule II could have been
used as a basis for all of the sanctions imposed. Id. at 2146. Furthermore, Rule 16(f)
could have sanctioned Chambers for his intentional pretrial delays which enables a
court to award attorney's fees when a party fails to participate in certain pretrial pro-
ceedings in good faith; Rule 26(g) could have been used to sanction Chambers for his
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Finally, the dissent urged that the Court's opinion would result in
an expansion of the power of federal courts. Although the majority
stated that the district court imposed sanctions for the fraud Chambers
perpetrated on the court and his abuse of process, the dissent believed
that Chambers was sanctioned in part, for his bad faith breach of con-
tract.2 60 The dissent stated that a district court cannot sanction pre-
litigation conduct pursuant to its inherent authority,261 possibly imply-
ing that a district court simply has less power here. The Court's inher-
ent powers extend only to rectify abuses of the judicial process, and do
not reach awarding damages for violations of substantive law. 262
The dissent also criticized the majority for not adhering to the ten-
ets of Federalism announced in Erie.263 To the extent Chambers was
punished for his breach of contract, the award is one of punitive dam-
ages for the breach, which is prohibited by Louisiana.2 16 Thus, the dis-
sent concluded that since Louisiana law prohibits such an award, had
NASCO brought suit in state court, it would not have received the
excess damages for the so-called bad faith breach.265
V. CRITIQUE AND IMPLICATIONS
The Chambers decision represents an expansion of the bad faith
exception to embrace bad faith inherent in the cause of action itself,
something which the Supreme Court has never clearly sanctioned. 26
The majority's affirmance of sanctioning Chambers' pre-litigation con-
duct, which was related to the enforcement of NASCO's contract
rights, is in essence a fee award against Chambers for his bad faith in
abuse of the discovery abuses; under Rule 56(g) attorney's fees could be awarded for
filing affidavits in bad faith in the motion for summary judgment; and 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 401 (1988) could have been used to punish Chambers for his contempt of the court
and disobedience of its process. Id. at 2147.
260. Id. The majority made reference to "Chambers' arbitrary and arrogant re-
fusal to honor and perform this perfectly legal and enforceable contract." NASCO, Inc.
v. Calcasieu, 124 F.R.D. 120, 136 (W.D. La. 1989); see also id, at 143 (Chambers
refused to perform without any legal cause, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for spe-
cific performance).
261. Chambers, Il1 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Id.; see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
263. Chambers, I11 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2147-48.
265. Id.
266. See Fleischmann Distilling, v. Maier Brewing Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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provoking the original dispute.2 67 In its understandable desire to
achieve the appellate court's ordered relief, the Court may have sent a
misleading signal to the federal courts not based on precedent.
While the Chambers Court presented a convincing analysis that
the sanctioning scheme of the federal rules does not displace the inher-
ent power of a court to impose sanctions, its expansion on that analysis
may have well defeated Congress' purpose in enacting the federal rules
- uniformity among the federal courts.268 The majority's reasoning is
persuasive in that the federal rules and statutes do not displace the
inherent powers to sanction a litigant for their bad faith conduct.269
Furthermore, the inherent power does serve an extremely important
function where the conduct at issue is not covered by one of the con-
gressionally created sanctioning provisions. 70 In this respect, the inher-
ent power is "both broader and narrower" than these other sanctioning
provisions, and this power must be used to fill in the gaps which the
federal rules and statutes simply do not cover.27 1 However, by permit-
ting a federal court to employ its inherent authority to sanction bad
faith conduct when that conduct is equally sanctionable under the fed-
eral sanctioning scheme, the Court commits several errors.
The first difficulty is with due process requirements. The Court
simply stated that when invoking the inherent powers, federal courts
must exercise caution in complying with the mandates of due process in
determining that the requisite bad faith exists. 272 Due process requires
that everyone is entitled to be informed "as to what the state com-
mands or forbids."27 However, upon a finding of bad faith, since
courts may resort to their inherent powers to impose sanctions, 27' par-
ties who litigate before tribunals have no notice as to the standards
which are required for them to avoid sanctions, until the litigation pro-
ceedings are complete. Imposing sanctions under this rudimentary stan-
dard thwarts the requirements of due process since the courts do not
require any notice or limiting provisions, as do congressionally created
267. See MALLOR, supra note 97, at 634-36. This is essentially a punishment for
Chambers' role in the substance of the dispute; in other words, bad faith inherent in
the cause of action itself. Id.
268. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
269. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134 (1991).
270. Id. at 2135.
271. Id. at 2134.
272. Id. at 2136.
273, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
274. Chambers, I1I S. Ct. at 2135.
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powers.2 75 The difficulty is that reasonable federal judges may differ as
to what amounts to bad faith conduct. Consequently, a litigant might
never know when to curtail vigorous litigation, and one federal court
may regard certain conduct as bad faith while another may not.
Aside from due process concerns, the Court failed to adhere to the
limits which the inherent power imposes on itself. The authority to ap-
ply inherent powers as a sanction for bad faith litigation practices can
only be exercised when necessary to preserve the court's authority.276
However, the majority simply did not address this limitation. Nonethe-
less, the dissent aptly pointed out that invoking the inherent power is
not necessary when congressional rules and statutes exist to sanction
the same conduct.277 Furthermore, the American Rule itself accepts
Congress' role in defining the procedural and remedial powers of the
federal courts, 278 as Congress has provided the federal courts with an
abundance of rules and statutes to protect and preserve its authority.279
However, by allowing federal courts to ignore such rules and statutes,
275. For example, FED. R. Civ. P. II stipulates that the signature of an attorney
or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading,
motion or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after a reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing
law. . .and if such a document is signed in violation of the rule, the court may assess
attorney's fees. Id. This rule puts the signer on notice of the standards which are ex-
pected in filing such documents, and the types of sanctions which can be imposed.
However, by allowing the standardless exercise of inherent powers, a court can impose
sanctions upon a litigant who is unaware that his specific conduct is sanctionable until
after he has committed such acts.
276. Chambers, 11l S. Ct. at 2132 (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
630-31 (1962) for the proposition that inherent powers are those "necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly, expeditious disposition
of cases"); see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (inherent
powers "are those which are necessary to the exercise of all others"); Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(inherent powers are those which are necessary to allow the courts to function); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (inherent powers are those "neces-
sary to the exercise of all others").
277. Chambers, Ill S. Ct. at 2143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 2, 9-10 (1941).
279. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (allows a federal court to punish contempt of
its authority and abuse of process); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (requires a federal court
to award attorney's fees against an attorney who multiplies proceedings vexatiously);
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (allows a court to impose sanctions against a party for failure to
follow pretrial orders); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (allows a court to impose sanctions on a
party or attorney for filling groundless pleadings, motions, and other papers); FED. R.
App. P. 38 (grants a federal court power to award costs for a frivolous appeal).
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and to permit the exercise of inherent powers "even if procedural rules
exist which sanction the same conduct," 80 inconsistencies are inevita-
ble. With such an amorphus and broad concept as the inherent power,
this self imposed limitation must be defined if these inconsistencies in
the federal system are to be avoided.
Another problem with the Chambers opinion"'1 is that, implicitly,
it represents an expansion of the bad faith exception to sanction a liti-
gant for pre-litigation conduct.128 The majority's application of the bad
faith exception to the American Rule is, for the most part, correct. The
Supreme Court has held that a court may assess attorney's when a
party has " 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons.' "283 However, the language of this standard has been strictly
applied to instances where fraud has been practiced upon the Court,28 4
and when litigation practices have delayed or disrupted the judicial
process.28 5 Along these lines, the majority's application of this standard
to Chambers' filing of false and frivolous pleadings, and his tactics of
delay, oppression and harassment are right on point. Nevertheless, the
Court's affirmance of the district court's opinion, and its broad analysis
of the inherent authority implies that the bad faith exception has been
extended beyond litigation tactics and now can explicitly reach a liti-
gant's pre-litigation conduct.218
The district court's opinion reveals that Chambers was partly
sanctioned for his arbitrary and arrogant refusal to honor and perform
the contract, 2 7 and for his role in the breach of contract.288 A fee
280. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2133.
281. Id. at 2131.
282. Id. at 2141.
283. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(quoting F.D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Co. Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)); see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n.4 (1968) (per curiam).
284. Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
285. Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
286. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy J., dissenting). As the dissent
points out, the majority insists that the lower court did not sanction Chambers for his
role in the breach of contract, but for the fraud and abuse of process practiced on the
district. Id. at 2138 nn.16-17.
287. NASCO, Inc., 124 F.R.D. at 136 ("Chambers arbitrarily and without legal
cause refused to perform forcing NASCO to bring this suit.").
288. Id. at 143 ("There is absolutely no reason why Chambers should not reim-
burse in full all attorney's fees and expenses that NASCO, by Chambers' actions, was
forced to pay.") (emphasis added). The lower court's opinion is full of statements
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award in this respect is essentially a punishment for Chambers' role in
the substance of the dispute and his bad faith in the cause of action
itself. 89 Consequently, any award of attorney's fees on this ground is
actually a substantive remedy and state law should have been applied.
Under this line of thought, an award of attorney's fees would have been
inconsistent with and undermined those principles espoused in Erie and
its progeny.
These principles are embedded in the American Rule as it bars
federal courts from engaging in fee shifting as part of the merits of the
award, but allows fee shifting to the extent necessary to protect the
judicial process. 90 By expanding the bad faith exception to a party's
role in substance of the dispute, several other concerns immediately
surface.
First, although an award on this basis arguably is within the
court's equitable authority, a potentially confusing overlap with the law
of punitive damages is presented291 as punitive damages are imposed
for a broad range of conduct, ranging from oppression, fraud, or malice
on one end to mere caprice on the other. 92 Second, an award of attor-
ney's fees on this basis will run counter to the underlying policy of the
American Rule. The American Rule protects a litigant's right in court
by vindicating his substantive rights.2 93 Since litigation is never clear,
no one should be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a law-
suit.294 Awarding fees based on a party's bad faith pre-litigation con-
duct disrupts the American Rule's balance between free access to the
federal system and penalties for abuses of it. If substantive fee shifting
is permitted, anyone with a novel, disputed, or uncertain claim involv-
which sanction Chambers for his role in the breach of the contract. Id. at 125. The
district court noted Chambers' "unjustified and arbitrary refusal to file" the FCC ap-
plication pursuant to the Purchase Agreement was in absolute bad faith. Id. The court
also stated that the attorney's fees and expenses charged to NASCO was a direct re-
sult and flowed directly from the suit for specific performance. Id. at 142 (emphasis
added).
289. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Awarding damages
for violation of binding contract, is a matter of substantive law. Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1, 35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
290. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
291. See Oakes, supra note 136, at 175.
292. John D. Long, Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L.
REV, 870, 881 (1976).
293. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (construing the ma-
jority's application of the bad faith exception to Chambers' pre-litigation conduct).
294. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v Maier Brewing Corp, 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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ing a substantial possibility of an adverse judgment will be deterred
from bringing suit because of the possibility that he could be taxed
with his opponent's fees. Finally, a fee award based on a litigants bad
faith pre-litigation conduct, where a state does not recognize the bad
faith exception, destroys the notions of federalism, as it is in essence a
substantive and not procedural remedy. Erie and its successors guaran-
tee that if a litigant takes his state law cause of action to federal court,
and follows the rules of that court, the result in his case will be same as
if he had brought it in state court. 295 To the extent that the Court
affirmed the imposition of sanctions which was based on Chambers'
bad faith pre-litigation conduct, the decision to file suit in federal,
rather than state court, expanded the scope of NASCO's remedy. 296
VI. CONCLUSION
If uniformity in the federal court system is our goal, courts must
exercise great care when invoking their inherent power. The Chambers
decision exemplifies the present confusion in the application of the fed-
eral bad faith exception to the American Rule. The Supreme Court
reached a fair result for the wrong reasons. When conduct is not cov-
ered by federal rules or statutes, a federal court should use its inherent
powers. However, the Court's notion that inherent powers can be in-
voked to sanction a litigant even when federal rules and statutes exist,
which cover the same conduct, is misplaced. The American Rule recog-
nizes that Congress, not the judiciary, controls costs and sanctions.
Further, the Court's superficial discussion of the necessity limitation is
a contributing factor in its reluctance to adhere to te.xt-based authority.
The award of attorney's fees because Chambers acted in "bad faith,"
rather than his violations of Congressionally mandated rules sends a
misleading signal to the federal courts. Likewise, imposing sanctions
which are in part based on a litigants pre-litigation conduct represents
for the first time, the Supreme Court's explicit expansion of the bad
faith exception, which subverts the American Rule and impinges on the
notions of Federalism. If the federal courts are willing to utilize their
inherent power as a means to impose sanctions, they must have some
guidance as to the circumstances that this undefined and ambiguous
295. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
296. Chambers, III S. Ct. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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power can be employed. Perhaps a better solution would be for a legis-
lative mandate to ultimately decide when fees can and cannot be
imposed.
Alexander B. Rotbart
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